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Executive summary 
 
Introduction 
This report sets out the results of the evaluation of two emergency interventions: outbreak of 
malaria and measles epidemic, carried out by OCG in Orientale Province of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo between June 2012 and July 2013. It is a retrospective evaluation that was done 
between March and May 2014, with the methodology based mainly on a review of documents and 
interviews with resource persons. Its objective was to capitalise on the lessons learned so as to 
improve preparation and response capacity for future epidemics in similar situations.  
During the malaria outbreak, MSF led a four-month emergency intervention (28 June - 25 October 
2012) targeting some 380 000 persons in the four health zones. In all, 58 761 cases of simple 
malaria were treated by the ambulatory units, and 3 537 cases of severe malaria were treated in 
four hospitalization units. In addition, 6 886 persons benefited from the “Test & Treat” strategy, 3 
236 of whom (47%) tested positive and received ACT treatment. 
To respond to the measles epidemic, MSF intervened for nine months (November 2012 - July 2013) 
and covered some 741 000 persons in the seven health zones. In all, 26 804 cases of simple measles 
and 4 114 cases of complications were treated by MSF. In addition, 189 067 children between the 
ages of 6 months and 15 years were vaccinated against measles, with coverage ranging, according 
to surveys, from 87% to 97%. 
 
Results 
Given the severity of the two situations, with mortality rates that significantly exceeded emergency 
thresholds, particularly during the malaria outbreak, and exceptionally high attack rates  in both 
epidemics, we find that the two interventions met the acute needs of the population and are 
considered highly pertinent.  
In this remote zone, with a dysfunctional health system, the intervention strategy targeting the 
therapeutic and preventive component and taking into account the two levels of the health system 
(hospitals and peripheral facilities), as well as the community, seems appropriate for attaining the 
set objective of reducing excess mortality related to the two outbreaks. However, we find that, for 
the two interventions, the needs greatly exceeded the operational capacities of OCG.  
With respect to the therapeutic aspect, the evaluation shows that the treatment of severe cases in 
hospitals monopolised most of the resources and thereby reduced the capacity of the teams to 
consolidate their activities on the periphery. However, to reduce mortality in this context where 
the peripheral facilities cruelly lack resources and the care is not free of charge , it seems wise to 
balance support between peripheral activities and work in the hospitals as best as possible.   
Concerning the timeliness of intervention, we note that the two outbreaks were detected very 
late. This is attributable mainly to inadequate epidemiological surveillance, but also to inadequate 
emergency preparation. This absence of work beforehand also contributed to the late opening of 
certain intervention sites, to the shortage of experienced human resources and to the tardy launch 
of vaccination campaigns.    
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With regard to the effectiveness of the therapeutic aspect, the evaluation shows that, despite 
challenges related to geographical access and the availability of resources, MSF succeeded in 
providing free treatment of simple cases in many peripheral facilities, as well as in introducing 
intensive paediatric care in a number of hospitals. However, we find that the availability of 
experienced human resources (national and expat) at the opening of projects and expertise in 
certain areas such as the organisation of care, the treatment of complicated paediatric patients, the 
provision of nursing care and the set up  of a blood reserve are essential to guarantee quality care 
and keep mortality low.  
The vaccination campaigns against measles got off to a very late start, for the most part at the end 
of the epidemic. The factors contributing to this delay were related to the authorisation to 
vaccinate, but also to the lack of preparation of MSF teams once authorisation was obtained. 
However, we find that, despite the logistical constraints, the vaccination coverages  were very 
satisfactory. 
The advocacy activities had a significant impact in the two interventions, such as success (even if 
late in obtaining authorisation to vaccinate against measles or the introduction of IV Artesunate in 
the treatment of severe malaria. However, the mobilisation of other actors was minimal during the 
two emergencies. 
With regard to operations, medical supply and pharmacy management were considered the weak 
points of the two interventions.  
 
Conclusions 
Despite the late detection of the two emergencies and many problems in implementation, the two 
interventions are considered successes. It is probable that, in the absence of MSF, most of the 58 
000 malaria cases  and 30 918 measles cases would not have received medical treatment, and this 
would probably have resulted in considerably more deaths in the affected zone.  
However, we find that often the same errors were repeated from one project to another and that 
there were few links between the projects. It seems pertinent to envisage, for this type of 
emergencies, evaluations carried out in real time in order to capitalise on good practices, but also 
to quickly correct errors in implementation.  
 
Summary of recommendations  
 Improve preparation for emergencies (strengthening of BEP, standard kits, proactive 
monitoring, recruitment plan, advance work with the authorities…)   
 Enhance the role of relocated staff in emergencies in the DRC (clarification of deployment, 
improvement of skills, appropriate tools….) 
 Facilitate the delivery of intensive care in emergencies (expertise on opening, guidelines on 
oxygen therapy specific position for nursing care support…) 
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 Guarantee the availability of a blood reserve during malaria emergencies (standard kit, practical 
guidelines,. expertise on opening) 
 Achieve a better balance of resources between activities in hospitals and on the periphery 
(change of mentality, better co-peration with MPH …) 
 Make supply autonomous during emergencies, clarify its role and relationships with other units  
 Strengthen pharmacy management during emergencies (appropriate tools, standard kits, 
support to those in charge) 
 Plan real time evaluations  during emergencies 
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Abbreviations 
 
ACT  Arteminisinin-based combination therapy 
ATB Antibiotherapy 
BEP  Bunia emergency pool  
CFR Crude fatality rate (taux de létalité brute)  
CHW Community health worker 
HR Human resources 
CI Confidence interval 
CMR Crude mortality rate 
CPA Complementary package of activities 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
EPI Expanded Program of Immunization  
EPREP Emergency preparedness plan (Plan de préparation aux urgences) 
GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 
GRH General Referral Hospital  
HA  Health area 
HAT Human African Trypanosomiasis 
HC Health centre 
HUBU Haut and Bas Uelé 
HZ  Health zone 
IEC Information, education, communication 
LogCo Logistic coordinator 
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army (Armée de résistance du Seigneur)  
MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (Enquête par grappes à indicateurs multiples) 
MII Mosquito net impregnated with insecticide 
MPH  Ministry of Public Health  
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières 
OCB Operational Centre Brussels (Centre opérationnel de Bruxelles) 
OCG  Operational Centre Geneva (Centre opérationnel de Genève)  
OP  Orientale Province 
RDT   Rapid Diagnostic Test 
SAM  Severe acute malnutrition 
SIA Supplemental immunisation activities  
SNIS Système National d'Information Sanitaire 
TT Therapeutic treatment 
U5MR  Under 5 Mortality rate   
VC Vaccination coverage 
WHO  World Health Organisation 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Objectives of the evaluation 
The general objective of this evaluation is to capitalise on the lessons learned in order to improve 
the capacity to prepare for and respond to future epidemics of measles and outbreaks of malaria in 
similar contexts.  
 
Specific objectives: 
 To evaluate the appropriateness and effectiveness of these two emergency interventions 
(strategic choices, timeliness of interventions, functioning , etc.) 
 To highlight the positive and negative aspects of these two interventions 
 To make recommendations for future interventions in similar contexts 
 
1.2 Methodology 
The evaluation methodology consisted mainly in 
a) a review of documents – activity reports, end-of-mission reports, final reports, survey reports, 
reference works, articles, etc. 
b) rapid synthesis and analysis of data available in the reports and from Qlik view 
c) interviews with resource persons (Geneva, coordination, field)   
 
The documents for review were provided mainly by the responsible program officer in Geneva, 
who also identified the main sources likely to provide answers to the questions in this evaluation. 
The additional documents were gathered following interviews with resource persons in accordance 
with the topics that needed to be further investigated. In addition, searches for complementary 
documents were done to further explore certain topics or to verify contradictory information that 
emerged during the interviews.    
Data analysis was not part of this evaluation. Only a quick search and analysis of data was carried 
out for the descriptive part of this report. 
The interviews with resource persons constituted the basis of this evaluation. In all, 67 people were 
interviewed during this exercise, including 16 who were seen during our visit to Geneva.  Of the 107 
persons contacted for a distance interview, 57 responded positively and 51 were able to be 
interviewed via Skype or by telephone. 
Fifty of the 67 people interviewed (75%) had a medical profile1 and 17 (25%) were non-medical2.  
                                                     
1
 Doctors, nurses, laboratory assistants, pharmacists, IEC, epidemiologists 
2
 Administrators, logisticians 
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Eleven people interviewed (16%) were based in Geneva or were  flying referents at the time of the 
two emergency interventions. Twelve people (18%) were members of coordination and 44 (66%) 
worked in the field.  
 
1.3 Limitations 
The principal limitations of this evaluation relate to the time elapsed between the two 
interventions, which took place between June 2012 and July 2013, and their evaluation, which 
began in March 2014.  
Because of this delay, the field visit and interviews with the target population were not taken into 
account. Nor were the opinions of the beneficiaries included in this evaluation.   
In addition, mainly for practical reasons (difficulty of organising distance interviews) no national 
and/or relocated staff were interviewed during this exercise. Considering their central role in the 
two interventions, their exclusion from the interviews is a weakness of the methodology chosen.   
Moreover, some resource persons in the two interventions were not available for the interviews, 
mainly because of their participation in another MSF mission.  
The absence of certain key documents (e.g. final report on the measles intervention) did not assist 
in understanding this intervention.    
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2 Context and description of interventions 
 
2.1 Context of the intervention 
The two emergency interventions (malaria outbreak and measles epidemic) that are the subject of 
this evaluation took place in the districts of Haut and Bas Uelé (HUBU) in Orientale Province. OCG 
has been present in this province since 2001 and two projects were underway there at the same 
time as these two emergency interventions: a regular program to fight Human African 
Trypanosomiasis (HAT) based in Dingila, and an emergency programme based in Dungu, targeting 
the population affected by the repeated attacks of the LRA. The latter was ended in December 
2012. Despite its reduced presence, the LRA remains active in the zone, imposing security 
constraints on the MSF teams in accessing certain areas of Haut Uélé.   
MSF was the only actor intervening in the two emergency situations.  Despite the mobilisation of 
other actors by MSF, the attention of other humanitarian actors present in the zone was mainly 
directed towards the conflict in Kivu. 
It should be noted that, concurrently with these two emergency interventions, MSF teams also 
responded to an Ebola epidemic that was declared in the district of Haut-Uelé (Isiro) and to a small 
outbreak of meningitis in Buta. These two interventions are not the subject of this evaluation.  
 
2.2 Operation of the health system in the RDC 
The health system of the DRC was inspired by the 1978 Declaration of Alma Ata, based on the 
Primary Health Care Strategy, and by the 1987 Bamako Initiative, focussed on community 
participation and the cost recovery system. The costs are often prohibitive for most of the 
population, and it is estimated that only 20% of the population makes use of health services (1). 
This is mainly related to financial and geographic inaccessibility.  
In this system, the operational unit is the Health Zone (HZ), which covers between 100 000 and 200 
000 inhabitants (2). Orientale Province has a total of 83 HZs. The health facilities of the HZ are 
divided into two levels linked by a referral system. On the first level, health centres (HCs) offer a 
Minimum Package of Activities to a population of some 10 000 inhabitants spread over a 
geographical area of 5 to 8 km2 and corresponding in the health plan to a Health Area (HA). On the 
second level, General Referral Hospitals (GRHs) offer a Complementary Package of Activities (CPA), 
including surgical care and blood transfusion. In the remote zones, a network of community health 
workers (CHW) provides, theoretically, a bridge between the population and health services. 
However, as the CHWs work on a volunteer basis, their activities are often difficult to seize.  
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2.3 Malaria situation in the DRC and development of the 
malaria outbreak in Orientale Province  
Malaria remains one of the major public health problems in the DRC, being the primary cause of 
morbidity and mortality among children under 5. Most of the Congolese population (97%) lives in 
areas with high transmission and Plasmodium falciparum is responsible for over 95% of infections.  
Katanga Province, Orientale Province and Kinshasa were the regions that recorded the most cases 
of malaria between 2007 and 2011 (3).  
In 2012, over 9 million cases and more than 21 000 deaths were reported by health authorities3. 
However, these figures represent only the tip of the iceberg because most of those stricken by 
malaria do not  go to health facilities.  
The availability of malaria diagnostic tests and treatments  (RDT + ACT) at health facilities is 
uncertain, given the lack of a partnership to support them.  
Moreover, the availability and use of preventive measures such as mosquito nets is low in the DRC. 
The last MICS showed that only 38% of children under 5 had slept under a mosquito net  
impregnated with insecticide (MII) prior to the survey (4) . 
Between June 2011 and June 2012, a number of MSF sections were induced to intervene in 
outbreaks of cases of malaria, localized phenomena in various provinces.  
During this period, approximately the following numbers of cases were treated: 
 some 70 000 cases in Maniema, in Equateur and in OP for OCB 
 some 15 000 in Katanga for OCP 
 some 30 000 in Katanga for OCA 
In Orientale Province, transmission of malaria remains intense and permanent with an upsurge of 
cases of malaria over a five- to eight-month period coinciding with the rainy season. While annual 
variations of the malaria incidence are usually observed in this context, the exceptional nature of 
the malaria outbreak observed in OP in 2012 should be emphasized (Figure 1-2).   
 
 
                                                     
3
 Source: PNLP 
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Figure 1: Weekly Incidence of malaria in Orientale Province, DRC, 2007- 2012 (S38) 
 
Source: EPICENTRE (based on cases and deaths reported in health facilities) 
 
In a context of ongoing transmission of malaria, we do not speak of a true epidemic. However, this 
malaria outbreak with significant excess mortality related both to high incidence and to an unusual 
seriousness of malaria cases, was considered an emergency situation.  
Figure 1 shows that the malaria incidence in OP gradually rose between 2010 and 2012. In 2012, 
the number of malaria cases began to increase from week 10 and reached its peak in week 21, 
followed by a plateau until week 28 and a gradual decrease from week 29. Lethality was 
considerably greater in 2012 compared to the previous years. It began to increase from week 11 
(2.25%) and reached its peak in week (4.32%) 
 
Figure 2: Change in lethality of malaria in Orientale Province, DRC, 2007-2012 (S-S38) 
 
Source: EPICENTRE (based on cases and deaths reported in health facilities) 
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The descriptive report of the malaria outbreak prepared by EPICENTRE (3) shows its focalised 
character, with the presence of several pockets particularly affected by this outbreak, the largest 
number of cases being recorded in the Pawa HZ and very high case fatality rates in the Bondo 
(19.5‰), Poko (16.4‰) and Aketi (13. ‰) HZs, Figure 3.   
Figure 3: Distribution of health zones by incidence of malaria and lethality 
 
 
The severity of this emergency was shown by the retrospective survey of mortality conducted by 
MSF in the Pawa HZ in November 2012 (5). This survey showed disturbing mortality rates, 
significantly exceeding the internationally recognized emergency thresholds4. For the entire 
reference period5 the crude mortality rate (CMR) was estimated at 1.5/10 000 persons/day (CI 95% 
1.2-1.7) and the mortality rate of children under age 5 (U5MR) was estimated at 4.56/10 000 
persons/day (CI 95% 3.1-5.7). The U5MR for the period between April and July 2012 rose to 6.83/10 
000/day (CI 95% 4.3-9.3). Causes of death possibly compatible with malaria corresponded to 63.9% 
of reported deaths.  
The comparative table of CMRs and U5MRs from mortality surveys  conducted by the various 
actors in the same region shows mortality rates higher in 2012 compared to 2010 (Table 1). 
 
                                                     
4
 ≥1 deaths/10,000/day and ≥2 deaths/10,000/day among children under age 5 
5
 The mortality survey covered the period between 25 December 2011 and  31 October 2012 
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Table 1: Comparison between  CMRs and  MRU5s according to four different surveys (6) 
Study Location Date Reference period Results 
COOPI 
Wamba & 
Pawa, DRC 
Mar.  2010  15.12.2009 – 15.3.2010 
CMR: 0.75/10 000/d (0.45-1.04%) 
U5MR: 1.52/10 000/d (0.75-2.29%) 
ACF ZS Pawa, DRC Dec. 2010 15.09.2010 – 15.12.2010 
CMR: 0.34/10 000/d (0.18-0.65%) 
U5MR: 0.47/10 000/d (0.18-1.21%) 
Epicentre 
MSF-CH 
Danga, DRC Sept. 2012 01.01.2012-25.09.2012 
CMR: 1.06/10 000/d 
U5MR: 2.91/10 000/d 
MSF-CH ZS Pawa, DRC Nov. 2012 25.12.2011 – 31.10.2012 
CMR: 1.51/10 000/d (1.2-1.8%) 
U5MR: 4.56/10 000/d (3.1-5.7%) 
 
Various hypotheses concerning the upsurge and gravity of the cases of malaria have been invoked 
(6, 7), such as  a) reduction in the effectiveness of ASAQ ; b) coinfection with another pathogen; c) 
change in virulence; d) increased vulnerability of the population; e) change in climatic or 
entomological factors; f) deterioration of certain components of the fight against malaria; g) major 
demographic changes; h) changes in epidemiological monitoring; i) change in access to care. 
It has not been possible to confirm any of these hypotheses. However, the methods needed to 
adequately explore them were not brought to bear.  
Moreover, OCB, which intervened in several malaria outbreaks in the DRC between 2011 and 2012, 
attributes them mainly to structural problems, particularly as related to a gradual deterioration of 
all components of malaria control (8).  
 
2.4 Measles situation in the DRC and development of the 
measles epidemic in Orientale Province 2012-2013 
Measles is endemo-epidemic in the DRC. The national policy of the Expanded Progam of 
Immunization (EPI) provides for a single dose of anti-measles vaccine (AMV)) administered at the 
age of 9 to 11 months. In addition, supplemental immunization activities (SIA) are regularly 
organised by the Ministry of Public Health (MPH) in collaboration with the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and GAVI. However, vaccine coverage (VC), while it has been increasing since 
2002, is still below the 95% recommended by the WHO. Coverage was estimated at 74% (CI 95% 
73-75) during the national survey carried out in 2012(9).  
The low vaccination coverage rate, plus the tardy and poor quality SIA, as well as the slowness of 
reactive vaccinations, contributed to a large measles epidemic that has been rampant in the DRC 
since 2010 and successively reached 7 of the 11 provinces of the DRC (2010-2011: Katanga, 
Maniema, Kasaï Oriental and Occidental, Sud Kivu, 2013: Equateur and Orientale Provinces (10). 
The first cases of measles in 2012 were reported in Orientale Province in week 18, and the peak of 
the epidemic was reached in week 48 (11) (Figure 4). By week 51, 28 303 cases and 991 deaths had 
been reported by the MPH (i.e., an overall lethality rate of 3.5 %).  
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Figure 4: Development of cases of measles in Orientale Province, DRC, 2012 
 
Source: NHIS of Orientale Province 
 
It should be noted that the attack rates recorded by the MPH during this epidemic were very high 
in certain zones (e.g., 10.7% in the Aketi HZ between W 1 and W 31 in 2013). However, the case 
fatality rates reported remained relatively low (0.5% in the Aketi HZ). To confirm these attack rates 
and to explore the mortality rates  specific to measles and the associated factors, a retrospective 
study was conducted in Aketi by EPICENTRE in November 2013 (12).  
That study confirmed the especially high measles attack rates, particularly among children under 
age of 5 (35.0 %, CI 95%: 31.2-38.7) with a case fatality rate of 7.1% in the same age grouping (CI 
95%: 31.2-38.7). Measles was the principal cause of death throughout the reference period6. On 
the other hand, the mortality rates reported in this study (CMR estimated at 55/10 000 
persons/day (CI 95%: 0.39 – 0.70), and the U5MR estimated at 1.74/10 000 persons/day (CI 95%: 
1.23 – 2.25) were lower than those reported during the malaria outbreak. 
                                                     
6  The survey covered a reference period from 25 December 2012 to 9 October 2013. 
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2.5 Description of emergency interventions 
During the malaria outbreak, MSF conducted a four-month emergency intervention (28 June - 25 
October 2012) targeting some 380 000 persons living in four of the 83 health zones of Orientale 
Province (Ganga-Dingila, Poko, Pawa, Boma-Mangbetu).  During this intervention, MSF set up four 
hospitalisation units in existing health facilities (GRH in Dingila and Niapu, HC in Zobia, Protestant 
hospital in Nebobongo) (Figure 5). MSF also provided  free of charge care for malaria cases in over 
100 peripheral health facilities. In all, 58 761 simple malaria cases  were treated by the ambulatory 
units, and 3 537 severe malaria cases  were treated in hospital units (7). In addition, 6 886 persons 
benefited from the “Test & Treat” (T&T)7 strategy, 3 236 (47%) of whom who tested positive 
received ACT treatment. A summary of the malaria intervention is shown in Table 2. 
Figure 5: MSF hospitalisation sites during the malaria intervention 
 
 
Tableau 2: Summary of malaria intervention 
 Dingila Zobia Niapu Pawa/ 
Nebobongo 
TOTAL 
Length of intervention 01/07-31/08 15/06-29/09 15/07-29/09 5/08-25/10 15/06-25/10 
No. of simple malaria 12 060 18 571 7 244 21 665 59 540 
No. of severe malaria 220 1 262 704 1 251 3 437 
No. of transfusions ? ? ? 312 ? 
No. of deaths 8 12 4 60  84 
Hospital fatalities 3.6% 1.2% 0.7% 6.1% 2.4% 
T&T Stratégie, RDT done (%RDT+) 0 4 448 (48%) 0 2438 (52%) 0 
 
                                                     
7
 Detection of systemic malaria with a RDT and treatment of all RDT+ cases (symptomatic or asymptomatic)) 
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To respond to the measles epidemic, MSF conducted a nine-month emergency intervention 
between November 2012 and July 2013 that covered some 741 000 persons in seven HZs of OP 
(Ganga-Dingila, Buta, Poko, Titule, Aketi, Bondo, Likati), Figure 6. The therapeutic component was 
implemented in all seven HZs via the hospital units and support to peripheral facilities. The 
preventive component (reactive measles vaccination ) was carried out in five HZs8. In all, 26 804 
simple measles cases of and 4 114 cases with complications were treated by MSF. In addition, 189 
067 children between 6 months and 15 years of age were vaccinated against measles, with vaccine 
coverage ranging, according to surveys, from 87% to 97% (12). A summary of the measles 
intervention is shown in Table 3. 
Figure 6: MSF intervention sites during the measles epidemic 
  
Table 3: Summary of measles intervention  
 G.Dingila 
- Zobia 
Buta G.Dingila 
Nord 
Niapu Titule Aketi Bondo Likati Total 
Length of 
intervention 
10/11/12 
13/01/13 
21/11/12 
15/03/13 
5/12/12 
12/03/13 
10/12/12 
13/01/13 
20/12/12 
20/02/13 
09/02/13 
30/06/13 
04/04/13 
17/07/13 
26/04/13 
30/06/13 
10/11/12 
17/07/13 
Simple 
cases 
2 345 4 203 2 486 306 3 055 12 359 1 591 459 26 804 
Severe 
cases 
310 875 462 68 240 1 633 430 96 4 114 
No. of 
deaths 
13 25 9 2 4 23 4 0 80 
Hospital 
fatalities 
4.8% 3.1% 2% 2.9% 1.1% 1.4% 0.9% 0% 2% 
Children  
vaccinated 
13 317 35 452 28 439 ? 30 080
9
 52 895 38 068 20 896 189 067 
                                                     
8
 Vaccination in two HZs (Titulé et Poko) was carried out by the MPH with support from UNICEF  
9
 Vaccination by MPH 
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It should be noted that the last period of measles intervention coincided with the peak of malaria in 
2013. Given the large number of malaria cases among patients suffering from measles, MSF kept 
the project in Aketi open for five weeks after the closure of measles activities to treat the malaria 
cases.  
In addition, during the measles intervention a number of cases of whooping cough were reported 
and treated in the Titulé HZ without a specific intervention by MSF. 
 
2.6 Intervention strategy 
The two intervention strategies (malaria and measles) were designed to reduce excess mortality in 
the most affected zone of Orientale Province. Four different approaches were initially proposed to 
achieve the principal objective: 
 “therapeutic” approach 
  “preventive” approach 
  “advocacy” approach 
   “research and innovation” approach   
However, we find that, during the two emergency interventions, MSF carried out mainly 
therapeutic activities.   
During the malaria emergency, MSF decided not to become involved in preventive activities, such 
as the distribution of impregnated mosquito nets (MIIs) or home spraying, mainly because of the 
logistical difficulties of this type of intervention in a context of very limited geographical access.  
MSF did, however, attempt to mobilise other actors, such as UNICEF, to carry out these preventive 
activities. However, advocacy efforts proved to be ineffective.  
With regard to the measles epidemic, the preventive activities (mass vaccination) were anticipated 
from the outset of the measles intervention. Nevertheless, for various reasons described elsewhere 
in this report, vaccination was carried out very late in terms of the development of the epidemic.  
The therapeutic component was designed in a similar manner for the two interventions, with the 
support of MSF on both levels of the health pyramid, as well as at the community level.  
MSF’s support on the various levels of the health system is shown in Table 4.   
 
 16 
Table 4: MSF Intervention on various levels of the health pyramid 
Health level Strategy/Activity Specific support General support 
Secondary health 
facilities (general 
referral hospitals, 
private facilities 
(Nebobongo), health 
referral centres (Zobia) 
- Free TT of 
complicated cases 
(malaria and 
measles) 
- Intensive care 
- Direct blood 
transfusion  
- TT of  malnutrition 
- Materiel and 
medicines support 
- Expat doctors and 
nurses  
- Relocated doctors 
and nurses 
- Bonuses to MPH 
personnel 
- Compensation 
envelope for cost 
recovery  
- Donation of 
medicines for 3 
months to 
guarantee care 
remains free after 
MSF leaves 
Primary health 
facilities (health 
centres and health 
posts) 
- TT of simple cases 
- Referral and 
transfer of 
complicated cases  
- Pre-referral 
treatment of 
serious cases 
(Rectal 
Artesunate) 
- Detection of SAM 
- Strengthening of 
epidemiological 
monitoring  
- Training 
- Medicines support 
- Bonuses to MPH 
personnel 
- Supervision by an 
expat nurse 
- 1 IEC/3 sites 
 
- Compensation 
envelope for cost 
recovery  
- Donation of 
medicines for 3 
months to 
guarantee care 
remains free after 
MSF leaves 
Community (Support 
to existing network of 
CHWs) 
- Awareness 
(symptoms and 
free care 
- Active detection of 
measles cases 
- Limited TT of 
malaria cases by 
certain CHWs 
- Attempts to 
monitor 
community 
mortality (CHWs)  
- T&T strategy 
- Training 
- Supervision by an 
expat nusrse 
- 1 IEC/3 sites 
(malaria) 
- Bonuses to RECOs 
 
 
It should be noted that, in the absence of authorisation by the MPH to provide mass treatment of 
malaria (without performing an RDT), MSF anticipated putting in place a Test & Treat strategy 
(systematic detection of  malaria + treatment of all cases with a positive RDT), while evaluating its 
feasibility and its plus value compared to “classic” methods. This approach is described in more 
detail in the chapter entitled “Effectiveness of the research and innovation component.”  
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3 Results 
 
3.1 Relevance and appropriateness of intervention 
3.1.1 Relevance of intervention 
The two emergency interventions (malaria and measles) met the real needs of the population and 
are considered highly relevant. The intervention criteria, as well as the exit criteria, were clear to 
the MSF teams, the health authorities and the population. 
The two epidemics showed exceptional attack rates, and the mortality rate was very high, 
especially during the malaria outbreak. The perception of a particularly serious situation was widely 
expressed by the persons interviewed: “The situation was beyond dramatic. I had the impression 
that it was war. There was not a family without a death. The population was traumatised, they had 
never seen anything like it…..”  
According to those interviewed, the population greatly appreciated MSF’s strong presence in this 
remote corner of the DRC: ”When I returned from working for the regular programme in Dingila, 
the people in the villages recognized me and thanked me for the emergency malaria intervention 
that saved many of their children. Even if a child died, the mother had the impression that MSF had 
done everything to save it.” 
 
3.1.2 Strategic choices 
In general, the intervention strategy (described in detail in chapter 2.1.6) targeting the therapeutic 
and preventive components and working with the two levels of the health system (hospitals and 
peripheral facilities), as well as the community, seems appropriate fir achieving the objective of 
reducing excess mortality in the most affected zones of Orientale Province. 
We find, however, that the principal focus of the two interventions was essentially on the 
treatment of severe cases in hospitals. Although activities on the periphery were initiated quite 
rapidly (1 to 3 weeks after the IPD), the hospitals continued to drain most of the resources and the 
outreach teams lacked the means to consolidate their activities (supervisory training, availability of 
motorbikes, etc.).  However, we find that, in the context of the dysfunctional and underutilized 
health system, the free treatment in peripheral facilities and the availability of motorbikes to 
transfer patients radically improved access to care. To further reduce mortality, it therefore seems 
appropriate to launch activities in the hospitals and on the periphery simultaneously and to better 
balance resources between the two components. This was also the conclusion of the EPICENTRE 
report that looked into the factors associated with measles fatalities (12).  It found that the case 
fatality rate was lower among persons who had been treated in an HC and/or in a hospital.  
However, the reduction in fatalities following medical treatment was much lower among persons 
living far from a hospital. This difference disappeared, however, with the introduction of free 
treatment of measles cases in peripheral facilities.    
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The preventive component was absent in the malaria intervention and very tardy in the measles 
intervention. This certainly contributed to the very high attack rates and to the particularly high 
number of severe cases.   
On the one hand, the decision not to become involved in preventive activities seems justified for 
the malaria intervention because of administrative difficulties and the small impact expected in the 
advanced phase of the malaria outbreak. On the other hand, the delay in vaccination against 
measles is regarded by most of the persons interviewed as a missed opportunity to stop the 
progress of the epidemic and reduce complications and deaths due to measles.     
 
Moreover, some strategic aspects were questioned during the interviews: 
 Little engagement by MSF with the health authorities, particularly in Kisangani. 
 Lack of clarity concerning the treatment of patients other than measles cases = lack or 
inadequate quantity of medication to treat certain pathologies, unavailability of transfusion kits 
in certain projects, etc. 
 Opinions were divided concerning the decision to support the private hospital in Nebobongo 
instead of the GRH in Pawa. For some, this decision led to antagonistic relationships with the 
MPH and instability in the health system. For others, the decision was justified because the 
facility was in better condition (fewer logistical demands), the staff was better trained, the 
facility was part of the health system and provided better access to the neighbouring zone, 
which was also affected. 
 Treatment of malaria by the CHWs considered unfeasible because of the low standard of CHWs 
and the lack of resources for training and close supervision. However, this strategy seems highly 
appropriate for remote zones (e.g., Zobia) 
 
3.1.3 Preparation for emergencies in the DRC 
While the intervention strategy seems appropriate to the emergency situations evaluated, the 
preparation strategy for emergencies appears to be inadequate.    
To make the response to emergencies in the DRC more effective, an emergency pool was created in 
Bunia (BEP) by OCG in 2007 with the objectives of carrying out epidemiological surveillance in 
Orientale Province, investigating alerts and triggering emergency interventions before the arrival of 
emergency teams, or ensuring the general management of small emergencies.  
We find that, at the time of the two emergency interventions evaluated, the BEP was not able to 
properly meet these objectives (undersized team, lack of leadership, absence of tools, etc.). In 
addition, the HR mobilisation strategy of the regular projects for the emergencies was not clear, the 
EPREP stocks were not up to date, epidemiological surveillance was not functional and links with 
the health authorities in Kisangani responsible for HUBU were virtually non-existent. Moreover, the 
emergency teams complained about the lack of administrative tools to facilitate HR management 
and the agreements with the Health Zones. Many shared the feeling of “working in a country where 
MSF had never set foot.”   
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3.2 Effectiveness of intervention 
3.2.1 Timeliness of intervention 
We find that the outbreak of malaria in Orientale Province was detected very late. While MPH 
statistics show that deaths from malaria gradually increased starting in week 11, with the peak 
being reached in week 23 (Figure 2), the first exploratory mission was only launched in week 24.  
The results of this evaluation show that the delay in detecting this outbreak is related mainly to 
ineffective epidemiological surveillance by regular program teams from the Bunia emergency pool 
(BEP) relying principally on alerts from the health authorities. We also find that the BEP was not 
properly sized and equipped to provide proactive epidemiological monitoring throughout Orientale 
Province. In addition, it seems that the exchange of epidemiological information between sections 
of MSF was not very effective. 
It should be noted that it was the population itself that alerted the MSF team in Dingila about the 
unusual mortality of children suffering from fever in Zobia. Following receipt of this information, an 
exploratory mission was quickly organized by the BEP which forwarded the information on the 
critical situation in Zobia promptly to the emergency cell. The emergency cell then sent an 
emergency coordinator, who immediately confirmed the results of the first “exploratory mission” 
and the need for an emergency intervention.  
MSF teams were then quickly deployed in the field, with rapid start-up of the project in Zobia, and 
a malaria unit was set up at the GRH in Dingila (the HAT project was put on stand-by). On the other 
hand, the start of the other projects (Niapu, Nebobongo) was slower and, due to the unavailability 
of HR, materiel and medication, the Nebobongo project was begun only after 3 weeks of the 
exploratory mission.  
We also find very late detection of the measles epidemic. Although measles cases gradually 
increased in Orientale Province from week 18 (Figure 4), and in MSF’s intervention zone from week 
33, the emergency teams left the zone in accordance with the set plan in week 43 (end of the 
malaria emergency). It should be noted that the OCG was unaware that a measles intervention was 
being conducted by the OCB in the neighbouring zones.   
Despite the presence of a number of measles cases in the hospitals, active urveillance of measles 
cases was not begun and staff of the health facilities received no training in the detection and 
treatment of measles cases. It was only in week 43 that MSF teams began to be altered about high 
levels of measles cases in a number of localities in Orientale Province and several exploratory 
missions were launched.   
We also find late detection of this epidemic despite the presence of emergency teams in the zone 
(weeks 26-43). The explanations are similar to those already cited for the malaria outbreak: the 
defective MPH epidemiological surveillance system and the absence of proactive monitoring by 
MSF, as well as a lack of communication with the others sections of MSF.  
As with the malaria outbreak, once the measles epidemic was confirmed by the MSF teams, the 
intervention was quickly launched. However, we also find that the implementation of some 
projects (e.g., Bondo, Likati) was late (5-6 months after start-up of the first project). 
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3.2.2 Identification and coverage of affected population 
The identification of target zones for the epidemiological investigations was based mainly on the 
alerts coming from health authorities or directly from the population. We note that each 
investigation except that in Poko led to the opening of a new project. 
The two intervention teams complained about the lack of an overview of the development of the 
epidemiological situation throughout Orientale Province. This prevented better planning of the 
opening and closing of the projects, as well as complete coverage of the most affected zones. “It 
was a discovery process. The scale of intervention was unexpected. We were not prepared, 
everything was improvised.” 
Retrospectively, we find that, in the two interventions, the needs greatly exceeded the operational 
capacities of OCG. However, the view was expressed in interviews that resources could have been 
better rationalised to optimise the interventions. “We did not learn from the errors made. If we had 
been better organised and prepared, we could have done more.”  
The LRA zone, located north of the Dungu-Doruma axis, was a special case. It was supposed to 
benefit from a strategy adapted to the specific security context (access by plane, dropping malaria 
tests and treatments, staff training, support for free care). Due to the lack of an aircraft to 
transport the staff following the decertification of the ASF aircraft based in Dungu, only a single 
shipment of medication was organized for Doruma. This support seems inadequate for the 
situation reported.  
 
3.2.3 Effectiveness of therapeutic component   
3.2.3.1 Treatment of cases of malaria and measles 
Treatment protocols  
At the time of the malaria emergency, a specific protocol was developed for the treatment of 
severe malaria cases , with several differences compared to the national protocol applied by the 
regular program: 
 IV Artesunate was introduced in agreement with the MPH10  
 Systematic use of antibiotics (Ceftriaxone) because of the suspicion of a coinfection with non-
typhi salmonella was required by the MPH for a time, but was quickly abandoned because its 
plus value was not demonstrated. 
The treatment protocol was harmonised between the regular programme and the emergency 
programme, although the use of IV Artesunate was late in the regular programme, pending a 
formal agreement with the MPH before the introduction of this new treatment.    
During the measles intervention, an internal OCG paediatric and nutritional treatment protocol for 
clinical cases during a measles epidemic (13) was used. This protocol was considered very clear and 
practical by the teams in the field. However, many adjustments were required because of the 
                                                     
10
 A verbal agreement was made by the Minister of Health during his visit to Haut Uélé after receipt of a document on the 
benefits of IV Artesunate produced by CAME (“Make the switch”) 
 21 
unavailability of certain medications or the availability in insufficient quantities of others, such as 
the elimination of certain systematic treatments, a change in antibiotics or of the dosages used. 
These repeated adaptations created confusion within the care teams with respect to the 
procedures to follow.  
It should be noted that, in the two interventions, the treatment protocol to follow was clear for 
cases of malaria and measles and their complications. But the treatment of patients suffering from 
other pathologies, particularly severe acute malnutrition, was less obvious.  
 
Quality of treatment in hospitals  
The results of this evaluation show that there were great disparities in the quality of treatment 
among the various projects.   
In the malaria intervention, the quality of care at the hospital in Nebobongo was particularly 
questioned, especially during the first four weeks of the intervention. Various factors were cited 
during the interviews: 
 Poor quality of local nurses and unavailability of relocated nurses - Nebobongo was the third 
project to open and the pool of relocated staff was exhausted. 
 Lack of national doctors (a single doctor for all the hospital units) 
 Inadequate supervision by the expat doctor – first mission without experience in paediatrics and 
tropical diseases  
 Tardy visit by the paediatrician – difficulty in being able to send a paediatrician quickly 
 Disorganisation of treatment units (triage, patient rounds, etc.) – team overmatched 
 Management team too occupied with management of the pharmacy and orders rather than 
spending time on staff training and the organisation of care – shortage of basic materiel and 
essential medications 
 
The problems described in the Nebobongo example were also very common during the measles 
intervention. In the latter, the quality of treatment also varied from one project to another and at 
different times. The presence of an experienced team at the start of the project seems to be the 
key point for the quality of care.  
Moreover, the example of Nebobongo shows that the absence of a person experienced in 
emergency paediatric care at the start of a project can result in high rates of intra-hospital 
mortality. The mortality rate in Nebobongo of around 15% in the first four weeks of the 
intervention quickly fell to less than 5% after the team’s corrective action following the visit by the 
paediatric referent.  
The results of this evaluation also show the need for a staff person solely in charge of supervisory 
training in quality of care. This person must be freed from managerial tasks such as management of 
the pharmacy, of medical human resources, peripheral activities, etc. We find that this type of 
expertise (persons experienced in organisation and supervision in a hospital environment) was rare 
in the field and, even if present, such persons were often co-opted by the managerial tasks cited 
above. This contributed to the gaps noted in triage, patient circuit, treatment of patients upon 
admission, monitoring of patients, correct taking of medication, etc.  
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We also find that the presence of experienced laboratory assistants is essential, especially during 
the setup of blood transfusion, in order to ensure security of the procedure. 
 
Treatment in peripheral facilities 
The outreach component was designed to make treatment available as close as possible to the 
communities in order to provide early care for simple cases and thereby prevent their turning into 
more lethal, severe cases. Deployment to all the health centres (and some health posts) in selected 
zones took place. Although resources for this component were undersized considering the large 
number of malaria and measles cases treated in the peripheral facilities and the number of cases 
referred, it seems that this component was quite effective. However, we do not have enough data 
to evaluate the quality of this component.  
 
3.2.3.2 Blood transfusion 
Blood transfusion was an Achilles heel of the two emergency interventions. Given the absence of a 
reserve of blood in the health facilities, the lack of blood was sorely felt, particularly during the 
malaria intervention. 
Although the direct blood transfusion system was set up quite quickly in all the projects, children 
were often transfused late (2-3 days’ wait) because of a shortage of donors among the family 
members accompanying the patients. To help solve the blood problem, a small network of donors 
was mobilised (living blood bank) in some projects, but this did not solve the problem of a shortage 
of blood. 
With regard to establishing a blood reserve in the hospitals, although this was envisaged by the 
emergency cell and coordination and was strongly advised by the referring paediatrician, the field 
teams were reluctant for fear of not having enough donors, but also of not sending contradictory 
messages to the community about the use of blood solely for the family. Without clear instructions, 
after receipt from the cold chain set up for the blood bank, rather informal storage of several blood 
bags was initiated by the national laboratory assistant at the hospital in Nebobongo.  
It should be noted that the experience of the BM hospital in Bunia was not adequately exploited to 
convince the teams of the benefits and feasibility of setting up a blood reserve in this context. The 
blood reserve at BM radically changed access to blood without the need to resort to outside donors 
simply by taking 500ml of blood from a family member (compatible or not)11 using a PENTA bag 
system,  which could have served up to four children suffering from severe anemia.  
For Geneva, access to blood was key, and many criticised MSF’s inability to set up a blood reserve: 
“I find that unacceptable. I believe better access to blood could have reduced mortality at the 
hospital.” 
However, it has been found that the teams responsible for setting up these blood reserves were 
not ready technically and strategically.  
                                                     
11
 Use of a PENTA (500ml +4x125ml) bag system. 
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In addition, we note that transfusion safety/security was not always assured, particularly in the 
programs’ opening phases. The issue was mainly problems with the use and interpretation of some 
pre-transfusion tests and the lack of qualified lab assistants. A number of doctors stated in 
interviews that they were faced with an ethical problem of whether or not to transfuse a child in 
critical condition without being able to guarantee transfusion safety/security.  
 
3.2.3.3 Oxygen therapy 
The use of oxygen was described as problematic during the two interventions and the problems 
were accentuated during the response to the measles epidemic. This was related to the nature of 
the complications of measles, which often results in respiratory distress.  
The problems related to oxygen therapy can be divided into two main categories: a) availability and 
use of oxygen concentrators; b) administration of oxygen  
With regard to the availability and use of oxygen concentrators, despite the fact that the teams 
were widely encouraged to use oxygen and order oxygen concentrators, we note that the number 
of concentrators was inadequate, but also a shortage of generators powerful and stable enough to 
operate several concentrators at a time, especially at the start of the projects. In addition, most of 
the oxygen concentrators used in the measles intervention were recycled from the malaria 
emergency or other projects in the DRC and were used under less than ideal conditions for these 
machines (dust, high humidity), frequently breaking down. Moreover, the maintenance of these 
devices was not always taken into account from the start of the programmes, and we note that the 
visit by the biomedical referant to several projects contributed to better use and maintenance of 
these devices in the field.   
The lack of oxygen resulted in the sharing of a single concentrator among several children, often 
without tubes adapted for the purpose (supply problem) and an often inadequate flow of oxygen. 
In addition, the teams often had to make arbitrary choices of children who would receive oxygen. 
The choice of these children varied from one project to another. Some applied strict criteria; others 
criteria of the best chance of survival.  
Regarding the administration of oxygen, the referents reported that its use was too systematic and 
too long, without clear criteria for determining the start and end of oxygen support or the flow of 
oxygen to be administered (no use of pulse oximeter ). However, the lack of an MSF guideline on 
the use of oxygen should be noted. 
 
3.2.4 Effectiveness of preventive component 
Vaccination against measles 
In order to quickly check the spread of the measles epidemic and reduce the number of serious 
measles cases and deaths, early reactive vaccination targeting children between six months and 15 
years of age was planned in all five HZs covered by MSF. 
However, this objective was not met and, as shown by the example of Aketi (Figure 7), the 
vaccination campaigns got off to a very late start, for the most part at the end of the measles 
epidemic.  
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Figure 7: Number of weekly cases of measles in the Aketi Health Zone, Orientale Province, RDC, 
2013 (Source MSF-OCG and MPH) 
 
 
 
The factors that contributed to the delay in the vaccination campaigns are many and can be divided 
into two separate categories: 
a) Problems related to authorisation to vaccinate 
b) Lack of preparation of MSF teams once authorisation was obtained. 
It should be noted that a number of problems led to delayed authorisation to vaccinate: 
 Delayed declaration of the measles epidemic related to the need for serological confirmation 
and to the dysfunction of the system for forwarding samples to the IRNB in Kinshasa – the only 
laboratory capable of confirming measles cases. We found problems with the collection, 
forwarding and transmission of results, but also a shortage of reagents in the laboratory. It 
should be noted that MSF did not play an active role in the handling of these samples (e.g., 
facilitation of collection and sending to Kinshasa or parallel forwarding to a laboratory in Uganda 
in case of rupture of the laboratory supplies in the DRC – always by agreement with the MPH to 
avoid diplomatic contretemps). The late declaration of the epidemic delayed vaccination, for 
example in Bondo and Aketi. Although the first samples were collected in week 46 of 2012, the 
epidemic was not declared before week 16 of 2013 in Aketi and week 17 in Bondo – a five-
month delay, with over 7 000 cases reported in Aketi at the time of the declaration of the 
epidemic!!!!). 
 Exclusion of the MPH from all MSF vaccination campaigns following the use of vaccines 
imported into the DRC without any authorisation and the used of expired vaccines by OCA in 
Katanga. The MPH then produced an official document authorising only the use of EPI vaccines. 
That is why the vaccines from Cameroon that OCG planned to import for the vaccination 
campaigns were put on standby. Moreover, MSF (all sections) refused to use the EPI vaccines. 
This situation could be resolved only a few weeks later after many negotiations in Kinshasa and 
Kisangani. MSF finally received authorisation to import the vaccines on the condition that the 
EPI be informed in advance and verify the sources of the vaccines and the storage conditions. 
However, no official authorisation was ever received for the importation and use of the vaccines 
held up in Uganda (the transfer by Uganda being a diplomatic faux pas). OCG succeeded finally 
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in getting a verbal agreement to use these vaccines. Meanwhile, the vaccines from OCB were 
used for the vaccination campaigns in Dingila and Buta.  
With regard to preparation for the vaccination campaigns, we find that the teams were not able to 
quickly start up these campaigns once authorisation was given. In fact, given the uncertainty of 
obtaining authorisation, the teams supposed to manage the vaccination were in process of 
supporting the treatment teams. Moreover, a major turn-over of expats in the midst of the 
vaccination preparation phase and the presence of inexperienced teams also contributed to the 
delay in the preparatory phase.  
Despite the considerable delays, the vaccination campaigns were finally launched in the HZs of 
Ganga-Dinguila Sud and Nord, Buta, Aketi, Likati, Bondo. In all, between 17 December 2012 and 29 
June 201312, 189 067 children were vaccinated by MSF. In addition, 30 080 children were 
vaccinated by the MPH in the Titulé HZ.  
Table 5 summarizes the vaccine coverage as shown by post-vaccination surveys (11). The results 
show that MSF’s vaccination strategy was adequate, since the objective of vaccinating at least 90% 
of the target population was reached in all the HZs.  
However, we find much lower vaccination coverage in the zones vaccinated by the MPH (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Vaccine Coverage in 5 HZs of OP as shown by vaccine coverage surveys   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**  Vaccination by MPH 
 
                                                     
12
 The vaccination campaign in Zobia took place before the exclusion of the MPH (December 2012). The vaccine stock 
from Dungu and Bunia was used for this vaccination. Subsequently, no vaccination took place before February 2103. 
 Certified by the card By parent’s statement 
Health zone Indicator CI 95% Indicator CI 95% 
Buta HZ 88.6 % 82.2 – 92.9 92.6 % 87.8 – 95.6 
Ganga-Dingila HZ 90.5 % 86.2 – 93.5 97.3 % 95.5 – 98.4 
Aketi HZ 97.7 % 97.0 – 98.4 98.8 % 98.3 – 99.3 
Bondo HZ 89.6 % 86.8 – 92.5 94.2 % 91.7 – 96. 
Likati HZ 93.4 % 90.8 – 95.9 96.8 95.8 – 97.9 
Titulé HZ** 51.4 % 39.6 – 63.0 74.8 % 61.3 – 84.8 
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3.2.5 Effectiveness of advocacy component 
The advocacy component played a major role in the two interventions, although it was better 
formalized during the malaria outbreak when health personnel were mobilised to better meet the 
short- and long-term general objective and the collaboration between MSF sections took 
precedence so as to speak with one voice. 
The results of advocacy activities are summarized as follows: 
 The use of IV Artesunate as a first-line treatment for severe malaria and its recognition by the 
MPH as a better alternative to quinine  
 Free of charge medical care  was announced in the zones affected by the malaria outbreak, but 
without the support of the MPH for its application 
 Some continuity in the supply of malaria tests and treatments  was ensured after MSF’s 
departure  
 The health partners, sponsors and agencies concerned were alerted to the malaria situation, but 
no intervention on their part took place. 
 Receipt (although tardy) of authorisation to vaccinate and the use of MSF vaccines. 
 
3.2.6 Effectiveness of research and innovation component 
A research and innovation component was developed during the malaria intervention in order to: 
 Describe the malaria outbreak and evaluate community mortality 
 Develop etiological hypotheses  
 Put in place innovative operational approaches (T&T) 
 Develop a modern medical information management system  
 
We found that a great deal of effort was invested in this component, with a number of studies 
done by EPICENTRE and by MSF teams: 
 Descriptive analysis of the malaria outbreak (including studies of hemocultures)  
 Retrospective survey of mortality in the Pawa HZ 
 Exhaustive survey of prevalence and of retrospective mortality in the Danga HA 
(including evaluation of the feasibility and plus value of the  T&T strategy)  
 Use of the T&T strategy in the Nebobongo project. 
 
However, we find that the result of these studies arrived late in terms of orienting operational 
decisions (description of epidemic) or were inconclusive (investigation of etiological hypotheses 
and of coinfection13, evaluation of T&T strategy – late implementation and lack of supervision to 
evaluate this practice). 
                                                     
13
 In all, 21 hemocultures were collected and examined between 9 August and 7 September 2012, eight of which were 
positive. After excluding one patient in whom Staphylococcus hominis was isolated, positivity was 33% (7/21), with four 
different germs isolated.  5/21 (24%) were positive for Salmonella species (3).  However, these results were insufficient to 
draw conclusions about coinfection. 
 27 
While this research and innovation component is considered highly pertinent in terms of changing 
operational practices, the problems of its implementation during large-scale emergencies were 
raised in the interviews. It was suggested that follow-on support from outside is necessary to carry 
out and supervise the studies so as not to overload the teams, which are often overtaxed by the 
operations.   
Regret was also expressed that the unusual malaria outbreak did not attract more attention from 
malaria experts so that more could be done to explore the etiological hypotheses.  
 
3.2.7 Operational analysis 
3.2.7.1 Human resources 
Human resources management 
Human resources (HR) management was considered especially problematic during the two 
emergencies. This is related to a number of factors, such as the scope of the interventions and the 
large number of HR sought, the cumbersome recruitment procedures, the poor qualifications of the 
national personnel identified on site, the limited availability of relocated staff and the shortage of 
clinical experience in the treatment of malaria, measles or emergency paediatric care among the 
expat doctors. Moreover, the difficult working conditions contributed to a large turnover of expat 
HR.  
The key role of relocated staff during the two emergencies was emphasized by many of the persons 
interviewed. However, their management was considered inappropriate to the difficult working 
conditions and the prolonged nature of these two emergencies. We were told that some people 
worked more than six months without taking holidays with a very fast pace of work. In addition, 
MSF administrators faced many constraints under the labour code of the DRC, such as a limitation 
on overtime that was difficult to respect during emergencies and then the inability to compensate 
for overtime worked outside of the law.  
Human resources management also constituted a source of frustration and of constant conflicts 
between the emergency mission and the regular program. On the one hand, the regular program 
tried to regain experienced staff as quickly as possible so as not to compromise the quality of their 
programmes; on the other hand, the emergency programs were not able to identify and train their 
replacements in such short time frames. 
The HR problems related to the quality of care are described in the chapter entitled “Treatment of 
malaria and measles cases.”   
 
Expertise required during startup of projects 
It is obvious that the startup phase is crucial for the smooth operation of a project. Being aware of 
this, the emergency cell identified a mobile team consisting of experienced people that was to 
ensure the startup of the various projects. However, given the problems in replacing certain key 
positions in the mission, such as the FC, MTL or Medco, this team served instead to fill these gaps.  
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It seems crucial for program startup to mobilise more experienced expats, including people from 
headquarters. But also to be able to benefit from the expertise of relocated staff, especially in the 
area of the organisation of care and training support in nursing care.   
 
Pre-departure briefing 
In emergencies with a large number of departures, arrival in the field with no briefing is not 
exceptional. This can be problematic, especially on first missions. It seems unrealistic to provide a 
briefing at headquarters for all expats. Alternative briefings have been suggested by those 
interviewed during this evaluation, such as training briefings online or the presence of a specific 
team in the field to give quick briefings and training (treatment guidelines, management tools and 
gathering of data, etc.).        
 
Support to teams 
The teams in general felt well supported by their field officers and the general co-ordinators. The 
support of the emergency cell was also appreciated, with the exception of a few micromanagement 
problems mentioned in the interviews. The lack of support from medical co-ordination during the 
first phase of the malaria intervention was raised in many interviews.  
With regard to support by the medical department (Dmed), the presence of the referring 
paediatrician and the mobile paediatricians was very much appreciated in the field, but a longer 
presence would have been desirable, given the complexity of treatment during the two 
emergencies.  
Regarding other problems (description and understanding of the epidemic, search for coinfection in 
the malaria outbreak, implementation of blood transfusion, etc.), the emergency cell did not feel 
adequately supported by Dmed.  
The lack of support by Dmed was felt particularly in the malaria intervention, especially given the 
absence of an MSF guideline on the treatment of a malaria outbreak: “We expect early and high-
quality support from Dmed. This was a unique situation. Everyone expected that a strategy would 
come from the field. We wasted time drafting this strategy while we could have done something 
else….”   
Moreover, the epidemiologists in the field regretted not having a technical referant.  
 
3.2.7.2 Logistics  
Geographical access to this particularly remote zone and the limited means of transport were 
major constraints in this intervention, compromising the movement of personnel and project 
supply. A few landing strips were able to be restored (Zobia, Aketi, Nebbongo, ..) to permit the 
landing of small planes and thereby ensure air supply for some projects, but space in the planes 
was limited. Other sites, such as Niapu, were accessible only by motorbike (nine hours by road from 
Zobia) and continual road maintenance was necessary (particularly bridge repairs) to maintain 
access. 
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However, it should be noted that MSF showed the feasibility of a large-scale emergency 
intervention in this context.  
Regarding geographical access in particular, transport presented a real challenge for the teams. 
The management of flights was especially challenging, for a number of reasons: 
 Landing strips too short, allowing the use only of small planes 
 Decertification of MAF planes, which was the main airline used by MSF in the past and was 
known for its great flexibility, especially in emergency interventions 
 Sharing of planes between the regular and emergency missions 
 Ban on carrying passengers in the ASF plane based in Dungu 
 Lack of agreement to rent an MSF plane 
 
Moreover, the improper use of motorbikes (125 in all) and failure to respect the standards defined 
by MSF regarding their use was mentioned in the interviews. In addition, some female expats 
complained of not being informed in advance about the use of motorbikes for transport over long 
distances because they did not feel comfortable with this mode of transport. It also seems that 
some moves were made without the use of communications equipment and without helmets, but 
these reports are anecdotal.  The use of rental vehicles of poor quality was also mentioned in the 
interviews.  
The logistical teams also encountered many problems in ensuring sufficient energy for the 
operation of all the hospital equipment (particularly oxygen concentrators) and for the cold chain.   
The generators provided were undersized and/or of poor quality and frequently broke down.  
It seems that communication between medical and logistics staff was not always optimal in terms 
of determining needs. We also find that the perception of priorities was sometimes divergent, with 
a lack of checklists about the minimal logistics package to be delivered to an IPD treatment unit or 
to outreach teams. 
 
3.2.7.3 Medical supply and pharmacy management 
The medical supply chain of the emergency projects, from the needs identification phase to 
delivery in the field, as well as pharmacy management constituted a weak point in the two 
interventions. This added dysfunction resulted in many stock ruptures in the field and a great 
frustrations among teams at all levels (headquarters, co-ordination, field), as well as among 
medical and non-medical staff. 
This is an especially sensitive and complex issue, where the problems are difficult to identify 
because of divergent interpretations and perceptions among the persons interviewed. There is a 
serious lack of clarity about the respective responsibilities of the various teams: medical, logistics 
and supply.  
The factors contributing to the dysfunction of the medical supply system and to the pharmacy 
management problems cited by the various persons interviewed were quite divergent  depending 
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on the type of persons interviewed (medical, supply or logistics) and are therefore presented 
separately. 
 
From the supply team’s point of view: 
 The supply setup was too light to serve the regular programmes as well as major emergencies. 
The reinforcement of the supply manager by an assistant took place after a few weeks, but the 
latter was still answerable to LogCo of the regular mission.  A new supply setup was put in place 
during the measles epidemic (emergency supply officer with the purchaser, who reported solely 
to the emergency LogCo, in co-ordination with the supply manager). This setup was deemed 
more effective and helped to reduce pressure on the supply team, as well as tensions between 
the two missions. 
 The status of supply was not understood. Some considered supply an independent structure, 
whereas it was fully answerable to the logistical coordinator (LogCo) of the regular mission.  
 Supply lacked an interlocutor for emergencies, notably in the initial phase of the malaria 
outbreak, The LogCo of the regular mission was not much involved in management of the 
emergency orders, and the emergency LogCo remained in the field. 
 Supply was not able to manage the medical stock in Bunia. This stock was intended to be the 
transit stock, but quickly became a “pharmacy” because, in order to meet orders from the field, 
it was necessary to open the boxes. 
 Dispatching of orders was complicated. The limited means of transport and recurrent changes in 
the planning of aircraft and space available for freight led the supply team to prioritise the 
shipment of certain packages. These did not always meet the priorities of the field. In addition, 
the constant changes in packing lists led to packages being shipped to the wrong locations. 
 Lack of anticipation by medical teams and problem of communication with supply. The medical 
team lacked an appreciation of their needs and did not notify supply of sensitive items (to never 
be without). The forwarding of information about medical orders was not fluid. The lack of 
projection of future needs contributed to an excessive number of orders. 
 Stock management in some places was deficient. A full box of anti-malaria drugs was found at 
the end of the project, while many ruptures de stock were noted in the same location.    
 
From the point of view of logistics:  
 The supply setup was too light to serve the regular programmes as well as major emergencies. 
The reinforcement of supply took place after a few weeks, but this was regarded as very tardy. 
 The management of orders was too cumbersome (use of Logistics) and was not adapted to 
emergencies 
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From the medical team’s point of view:   
 The time between order and delivery was too long. The regular mission’s supply procedures 
were too complex and were not adapted to emergencies.  
 Many stock breakages of essential items because of supply problems and the medical team’s 
failure to anticipate. Consequently, some patients had to return several times for their 
treatments (e.g., ACT), or the treatment protocols had to be adapted to suit the medications 
available. 
 Lack of a pharmacist in the medical supply chain. The arrival of a pharmacist in central stock was 
tardy. Moreover, she was not able to provide support to the field for the management of their 
medical stocks.  
  Inappropriate pharmacy management tools. Follow-up on consumption, the definition of  
needs and the preparation of orders were problematic because of the lack of understanding of 
the system (in many cases it was the nurses’ first mission in charge of the pharmacy), but also 
because of inappropriate management tools. The Excel spreadsheet for consumption follow-up 
and Easy-med used for orders were not complementary and the ordering process was therefore 
not practical. In addition, the field team lacked an appreciation of medical stocks and the alert 
system for pre-ruptures was not in place.  
 Lack of checklists for medication and materiel to be ordered for this type of emergency. At the 
start of activities, the team often lacked certain items, despite the fact that the materiel 
required was very similar at each opening. A number of people mentioned that the standard kits 
ordered were not very useful for these two interventions. 
 
3.2.7.4 Management of medical data 
The management of medical data was problematic during the two emergency interventions.  
Data from epidemiological surveillance at the MPH facilities was unreliable because of problems of 
completeness and promptness and also of case definition and under-notification related to the 
small number of people going to these facilities. This prevented the teams from having a 
comprehensive overview of the distribution of cases and of deaths in time and space. 
To solve this problem and also to obtain more data than usual, MSF designed new software (Qlick 
view) to allow the individual recording of malaria and measles cases and the subsequent viewing of 
the development of outbreaks in various geographic localities. One of the advantages of this tool 
was the possibility of rapid sharing of data between the field, coordination and headquarters. 
We find that this tool was much appreciated by the medical officers at headquarters and at 
emergency coordination and in certain field settings.   
On the other hand, it should be noted that this tool was designed quickly to respond to a novel 
situation for MSF and that it was not completely finalised before its introduction. The operating 
errors were therefore numerous, but were quickly resolved by the person who designed the tool. 
The need for an Internet connection for the viewing and sharing of data also constituted a weak 
point in this regard.   
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We accordingly find that the introduction of this tool in the field often caused problems, given the 
reluctance of some to use it on line, frequently out of fear (apparently unwarranted) that it would 
be too expensive. In addition, some medical staff continued the collection of parallel data, because 
without the Internet connectionon they were unable to consult their data.  
Apart from the technical problems relating to the tool itself, the problem of supervising the 
collection of data was raised. The data encoders were often left to themselves and the lack of data 
managers was sorely felt.   
Moreover, the field epidemiologists devoted most of their time to the implementation of Qlikview 
and had little time to support the teams in analysing data and describing the development of the 
epidemic.  
With regard to the prospective surveillance of mortality in the community, a number of attempts 
were made to involve CHWs in this follow-up, but this component never really functioned.  
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4 Conclusion and discussion 
 
Successful interventions under particularly difficult access conditions  
Despite the late detection of the two emergencies and many problems in implementation, the two 
interventions are regarded as successes. It is probable that, in the absence of MSF, most of the 
58 000 malaria cases and 30 918 measles cases would not have received medical treatment, and 
this would probably have resulted in considerably more deaths in the affected zone.  
The intervention strategy involving free medical treatment in hospitals and peripheral facilities and 
a referral system provided by MSF definitely helped reduce the burden of the two outbreaks.  
However, we find that, for the two interventions, the needs greatly exceeded the operational 
capacities of OCG.  
 
Emergency preparation: key to a rapid response  
Emergency interventions in a country that has an MSF presence should be built on a solid 
foundation of preparatory work, especially in the DRC, where emergencies are recurrent. Such 
preparation includes the development and regular updating of an emergency preparation plan 
(EPREP), the pre-positioning of stocks, an HR recruitment and management (emergency pool) plan, 
guidelines on administrative and financial procedures (contract management, examples of MoUs, 
bonus payment system, etc.), as well as advance work with the health authorities to facilitate the 
implementation of certain activities during the emergencies (e.g.. importation of vaccines, 
authorisation for vaccination campaigns, etc.). In addition, an effective epidemiological monitoring 
system is essential in the preparatory phase.  
In the two emergencies, emergency preparation was inadequate and this contributed to the late 
detection of the two outbreaks, to the HR management problem and also to the delay in the 
measles vaccination campaign.  
 
Epidemiological surveillance: need for a more active system 
Passive waiting for alerts from health authorities proved inadequate for detecting epidemics at an 
early stage. Moreover, even an MSF presence in the zone did not permit rapid detection of the 
epidemics.   
The establishment of a more proactive surveillance system seems advisable (e.g., regular contact 
with the medical responsible of the health zones  and key people in the population, active 
surveillance through sentinel sites  , etc.) in order to obtain epidemiological information faster. 
Regular contact with the health authorities in Kisangani, who have a wider vision of the 
epidemiological situation despite a problem with the completeness of their data, also seems 
important. In addition, more regular contact with other MSF sections would make it possible to 
improve the overview of the epidemiological situation in the DRC and in Orientale Province in 
particular.   
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Relocated staff: a pillar of response to emergencies in DRC 
During malaria and measles emergencies, the support of MPH staff (doctors, nurses, laboratory 
assistants, etc.) by experienced personnel is essential for ensuring quality care in hospital facilities, 
and we find that the absence of such support can contribute to high mortality rates in these 
facilities, particularly in the opening phase of projects.  
We also note that the supervision of national staff by expat medical staff without experience in the 
treatment of tropical diseases and in paediatric emergency care is not appropriate for these types 
of interventions.  In the DRC context, such supervision can be better provided by experienced 
national staff working in other MSF projects or belonging to the emergency pool (relocated staff). 
The latter must, however, be supervised by flying experts (paediatricians, laboratory assistants, 
quality of care experts, etc.) and be trained in advance of the various emergency situations.  
A special effort seems to be needed to develop and maintain such expertise within regular projects 
and to agree to “release” these resources at times of emergencies for periods long enough to set 
up quality emergency projects. It seems that slightly “overstaffing” the regular programs in order to 
second some persons more easily during emergencies is not a luxury in a context of repeated 
emergencies--all the more so in that such persons seem to be the most effective in this type of 
emergency. 
It also seems important to guarantee the presence of experienced staff during the startup of all 
projects, not only during the first openings, as was the case in these interventions (e.g., shortage of 
experienced staff during the opening in Nebobongo).  
 
Quality of nursing care: need to be strengthened 
The treatment of patients in the DRC is for the most part provided by nurses. For this reason, to 
reduce intra-hospital mortality in emergencies, nursing care must be strengthened. During the 
malaria or measles outbreaks, this need was strongly felt in terms of intensive paediatric care, and 
we find that the local staff is unfamiliar with this type of care. Major gaps were identified in the 
admission and stabilisation of patients, which are the critical moments for their survival and during 
which doctors are often absent. In addition, if MSF implements new protocols (e.g., IV Artesunate) 
or provides sophisticated materiel (e.g., oxygen concentrator) supervisory training of sufficient 
duration must be provided.    
It seems warranted to create specific positions responsible for the quality of nursing care. In the 
DRC context, this role can also be filled by experienced national staff, who must be properly trained 
in advance and have access to appropriate tools.  
 
Decentralised treatment: a challenge to be met  
In the context of a dysfunctional health system that is not frequently used because care is not free 
and because of problems of geographical access, the free care provided in peripheral facilities and 
the availability of motorbikes for patient transfers radically improved access to care. To further 
reduce mortality, it therefore seems pertinent to begin activities in the hospitals and on the 
periphery simultaneously and to better balance resources between the two components. This was 
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also the conclusion of the EPICENTRE report that examined the factors associated with measles 
fatalities. 
 
Need to integrate the lessons learned quickly 
We find that frequently the same mistakes were repeated from one project to another and that 
there were few links between projects. It seems pertinent to envisage for this type of emergency 
evaluations carried out in real time so as to capitalise on good practices, but also to quickly correct 
errors of implementation.  
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5 Recommendations 
 
Recommendation Level concerned 
Emergency preparation: key to a rapid response 
Create standard kits for the opening phase of malaria and 
measles emergencies (e,g,. therapeutic treatment kit for 50 
severe cases) 
Emergency platform 
Adapt treatment protocols to the context and ensure that orders 
are in line with the protocols  
Medical Department 
Emergency cell 
Finalise the response guideline for a malaria epidemic and 
include the management of exceptional outbreaks in non-
epidemic zones   
Malaria working group 
Improve emergency preparation in the DRC (strengthening of 
BEP, emergency stock, proactive monitoring, recruitment plan 
for emergencies and creation of a pool of qualified HR in the 
various fields, administrative procedures kit, advance work with 
the authorities, etc.   
Cell 3 
Regular DRC mission 
Relocated staff: a pillar of response to emergencies in the RDC 
Clarify the deployment and extend the missions of relocated 
staff in emergencies  
Regular DRC mission  
Provide ongoing training in the various emergency fields Regular DRC mission 
Reactive vaccination against measles: need to be faster    
Support the sending of blood samples to referral laboratories to 
speed up the process of confirming the epidemic (required for 
authorization to conduct a reactive vaccination)  
Emergency cell 
Clarify the mechanism for importing measles vaccines into the 
DRC in  RDC in the event of an epidemic 
Regular DRC mission 
Pre-negotiate reactive mass vaccination agreements with the 
health authorities (with implementation methods involving the 
health authorities)  
Regular DRC mission 
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Recommendation Level  concerned 
Hospital care in emergencies: need for better supervision 
Facilitate the delivery of emergency care in emergencies 
(expertise at opening, guidelines on oxygen therapy, specific 
position for nursing support, etc. 
Emergency cell 
Medical Department 
Guarantee the establishment of a blood reserve during malaria 
emergencies (standard kit, operating protocol, expertise  at 
opening) 
Emergency cell 
Medical Department 
Decentralised treatment: a challenge to be met 
Achieve a better balance of resources between activities in the 
hospitals and on the periphery (change of mentality, better co-
operation with MPH, etc.) 
Emergency cell 
 
Supply and pharmacy: need for more clarity 
Clarify the role of supply during emergencies and the links with 
other services  
Operations, Supply 
Department, Medical 
Department 
Make emergency supply autonomous while relying on the 
existing structure (position as focal point for emergencies with 
hierarchical link to the emergency LogCo and technical link with 
the supply manager)  
Operations 
Supply Department 
Strengthen pharmacy management in emergencies (presence of 
pharmacist at opening, appropriate tools, standard kits, support 
for persons in charge) 
Emergency cell 
Medical Department 
Need to integrate the lessons learned quickly 
Make provision for evaluations in real time during emergencies Emergency cell 
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6 Annex 
 
6.1 Terms of reference 
 
TERMES DE 
REFERENCES v7_ENG.doc
 
 
6.2 List of interviewees 
 
1 ABELLO PEIRI, Carme IEC,  Zobia, Niapu, Nebobongo 
2 AEBY, Carole IPD Nurse, Outreach and IEC vaccination, Buta 
3 APOLINAR, Alfonso Doctor, Bondo and Likati, exploratory mission meningitis in Buta 
4 ARNOLD, Cassandra Doctor, Aketi  
5 ARNOLD, Martina IPD Nurse, Zobia 
6 AUSTRUP, Kathrin Pharmacist, Bunia 
7 BARUTWANAYO, Divin Emergency Co-ordinator 
8 BEAUPAIN, David Logistician, Stock Bunia 
9 AUDREY, Binet Outreach Nurse, Bondo 
10 BICHET, Mathieu Deputy Program Manager  – Emergency Cell, Geneva 
11 BOURQUE, Berthier Doctor, Buta 
12 BROWN, Katy Field Medical Officer, Nebobongo and Nurse, Aketi 
13 BUERKLI, Marco Field Officer, Buta  
14 CACIOPPE, Sita Field Medical Officer, Zobia and Niapu 
15 CAPITAINE, Adrien Vaccination Logistician, Aketi 
16 DAVIES, Lynsey Nicole Doctor, Nebobongo 
17 DE LA TOUR, Rorbeto Laboratory referent , Genève 
18 DE MIGUEL PLIEGO, Emma Pharmacist, Bunia 
19 DELAITRE, Antoine Emergency Co-ordinator 
20 DELMAS, Marie IPD Nurse, Aketi 
21 DELUY, Cécile HRCO, Bunia 
22 DUC, Géraldine Field Medical Officer and Outreach Nurse, Titule 
23 DUPONT, Aurélie Administrator-Deputy-HOM-Bunia, and Field Officer-Buta  
24 FERNAGU, Julie Logistician-Nebobongo and LogCo-Bunia 
25 FRIAS DIAZ, Franking Doctor, Interim Medco, MTL-Nebobongo, FC-Nyapu 
26 GAUGE, Antoine Emergency Co-ordinator 
27 GIGNOUX, Etienne Référent Epidémiologiste, EPICENTRE, Geneva 
28 GONZALES, Alan Medical Co-ordinator 
29 GRANDCLEMENT, Gilles Logistician, Zobia 
30 GRISEL, Elisabeth IPD Nurse, Buta 
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31 HO, Leo Référent Pédiatrie, Genève 
32 HUMBERT, Nicole Admin,  Nebobongo 
33 JAY, Ana IPD and vaccination nurse, Likati 
34 KOUKPO, Gilles Doctor, Zobia, Nyapu, Buta 
35 LANNEAU, Benjamin LogCo, E-Coordo 
36 LEON, Christine Epidemiologist 
37 LELEVRIER, Yann Deputy  Programme Manager  – Emergency Cell, Geneva 
38 LESSARD, Isabelle Nurse – Field Officer, Buta  
39 MANICHON, Marie Noelle Doctor, Zobia and Titule 
40 MARTINEZ GARCIA, Daniel Flying Paediatrician, Zobia and Buta 
41 MATHIEU, Julien Logistician, Buta 
42 MOLEKO MBONDE , Jehu Doctor, Buta 
43 MORANDAT, Francoise Nurse – Field Officer, Nebobongo 
44 NEUMAN VOLMER, Amy Doctor, Aketi 
45 OUSMANE, Moussa Field Medical Officer,  Bondo and Aketi. Explo Meningitis Buta 
46 PELORCE, Stephanie Laboratory Assistant, Nebobongo,Nyapu, Zobia 
47 PETERSEN, Marianne- Luise IPD Nurse,  Zobia 
48 PITTET, Anne Flying Paediatrician, Zobia 
49 QUERE , Michel Medical referent , Cell 3, Geneva 
50 RAVAUD, Annette Patient Therapeutic Education and Health Personnel Training, Geneva 
51 REBHOLZ, Cornelia Eva Epidemiologist 
52 ROCHET, Frédéric Logistician, Aketi 
53 ROMEO, Kristin IPD Nurse-Zobia and Vaccination Nurse-Dinguila 
54 ROSSEL, Ludovic Medical data manager, Geneva 
55 ROWE SERRANO, Daniel LogCo, E-Coordo 
56 RYMSHAW, Ellen Nurse – Field Officer,  Zobia et Nyapu 
57 SCARATO, Muriel Doctor- Field Officer, Buta 
58 STERK, Esther Tropical Diseases Referent, Geneva 
59 STERVINOU, Florence Administrator, Buta 
60 STORCHENEGGER, Sandra IPD Nurse, Aketi 
61 SVITKOVA, Anna Paediatric Doctor,  Titulé 
62 TCHATON, Marie Doctor, Zobia, Niapu and Nebobongo 
63 TENA RUBIO, Javier Epidemiologist 
64 UZZENI, Florent BEP Officer, Emergency Co-ordinator 
65 VARGAS PIECK, Alejandro Field Medical Officer, Aketi 
66 WEGA KWEKAM, Narcisse Emergency Co-ordinator 
67 ZABSONRE, Inoussa Doctor, Buta 
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